The concept expressed by the use of a word in a context often diverges from its lexically encoded context-independent meaning: it may be more specific or more general (or a combination of both) than the lexical meaning. Grasping the intended concept involves a pragmatic process of relevance-driven adjustment or modulation of the lexical meaning in interaction with the rest of the utterance and with contextual information. The issue addressed here is the nature of the input to the pragmatic process of meaning adjustment, that is, the nature of the standing (encoded) meaning of the word type. The widespread assumption that lexical meaning is conceptual, hence directly expressible, is challenged and a case made for the merits of an account of word type meaning in non-conceptual terms.
qualify as a meaning of the expression type. Two apparently rather different possibilities that have been suggested are (a) collections of memory traces or exemplars of previous uses (tokenings) and (b) bundles of contingent encyclopaedic information about the things in the world the word is used to refer to.
These four positions (ordinary concepts, lexical concepts, abstract schemas or constraints, previous uses or encyclopaedic information) can all be seen as falling within a broadly contextualist view of word meaning and they correlate roughly with the four contextualist positions set out by Recanati (2004) . The most conservative of these is the 'strong optionality' position (quasi-contextualism), according to which a word's meaning may contribute directly (unmodulated) to truth-conditional content or may be pragmatically modulated/adjusted. The second is the 'pragmatic composition' view, according to which a word meaning (lexical concept) could be an expressed sense, but the process of composing it together with the other words in the utterance forces its pragmatic adjustment. On the third, more radical, view which Recanati calls the 'wrong format' position, word meanings cannot enter directly into thought, but must be transformed into the right (conceptual/contentful) format, presumably by some pragmatic interpretive process or other. Here, there is a distinction between the 'semantic structures' of linguistic expressions and the conceptual structures of thought. If word meanings are abstract schemas or sets of constraint or rules for use, then they are in the 'wrong format' to be semantically contentful or to be constituents of thoughts. Finally, there is the most extreme position, that of meaning eliminativism, according to which words (qua types) do not have meanings at all; only tokens (specific utterings) of words have meanings.
It is instantiations of these latter two broad positions that I want to consider as possible candidates for what word types bring to the pragmatic processes of utterance understanding. I will present a range of considerations that point in the direction of there being something less than a fully conceptual meaning for words, thus ruling out the first two positions. I have no knock-down arguments and there are some obvious pitfalls to taking on this non-conceptual view. However, I do think it merits serious consideration, especially when placed in the context of relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatics, which offers an explanatory account of how the concept a speaker expresses with a word can vary across occasions of use. 
Relevance theory pragmatics
The view that sentence meaning (logical form) is seldom, if ever, fully propositional has been a basic tenet of relevance theory (RT) since its inception. The claim is that it is a propositional template or radical, which must be pragmatically completed and elaborated on each occasion of utterance in order to derive the propositional content meant 1 An anonymous referee has suggested that I should make it explicit early on that, in this paper, I am treating all (open class) words as having the same kind of meaning and not discriminating between those words that are (semantically) polysemous and those that are not. In fact, I am far from sure that any such distinction should be made: my working hypothesis is that (open class) words quite generally are susceptible to pragmatic adjustment in context and that some, a minority, of these (initially ad hoc) derived senses become routinized or conventionalized to varying degrees, due to repeated use. What we describe as 'polysemous words' are those whose several senses have crossed some threshold of frequency or conventionality.
In (1a), the linguistically encoded content is a trivial truth, hence uninformative, insufficiently relevant. The addressee's process of trying to derive contextual implications from the utterance, in accordance with his expectation of relevance, leads to the encoded concept MAN being narrowed down so as to encompass just men of some kind. Depending on the specifics of the context, it could be narrowed down to 'typical man' or 'ideal man' and, of course, what constitutes a typical man or an ideal man will itself vary from context to context. The outcome of this process is an occasion-specific sense (or 'ad hoc' concept) MAN*, which picks out a proper subset of the set of individuals that fall under the original encoded concept MAN. In (1b), we have the opposite phenomenon: the encoded concept CHILD is adjusted so as to mean roughly 'person who behaves in certain childish (or child-like) ways', and the result is a concept CHILD* which is broader than the lexically encoded concept -it includes actual children and some adults. Then, if we take (1c) as an utterance by Boris's wife, who has long endured his affairs with other women and general lack of commitment, this is, arguably, both a broadening of the lexical concept BACHELOR (it includes married men who behave in certain ways) and a narrowing (it excludes bachelors who don't behave in this stereotypic way). Finally, (1d) is a typical metaphorical use, which in standard RT is taken to be a radical kind of broadening, so the concept communicated, behaviour so as to fit in with current surroundings or circumstances', includes actual chameleons (a kind of lizard) and certain human beings (and any other creatures with the property at issue). (Fodor 2008: 95) .
Encyclopaedic information plays a key role in the relevance-theoretic process of lexical concept adjustment. When a lexical concept is accessed via the usual linguistic decoding process, the encyclopaedic information associated with it is activated. Some There's no arguing with the existence and importance of this kind of general world knowledge associated with words and concepts, nor with the claim that it is contingent, that is, it is extrinsic to the concept's content and plays no part in its individuating conditions. The part of the story that one could take issue with is the linguistic semantic part; that is, the claim that word type meanings are concepts. In the next section, I'll set out some considerations that make an alternative non-conceptual account worth serious investigation.
Considerations in favour of a schematic (underspecified) lexical meaning
I take it that concepts are, first and foremost, constituents of thoughts. This is in accordance with Fodor's view of them as, in effect, words of Mentalese (the language of thought) and with the views of most people working within cognitive science, including relevance theorists. So the first point I want to consider here concerns the role of the hypothesised encoded word meanings (lexicalised concepts) as components of thought. etc, and others which depend on broader non-linguistic context (e.g. when opening a door might involve breaking it down with an axe, or opening one's mouth might require removal of stitches with which it has been fastened). However, they maintain that the pragmatic adjustment process is optional because: "It may so happen that the intended concept is the very one encoded by the word, which is therefore used in its strictly literal sense" (Sperber and Wilson 1998: 196-97 As far as I can tell, the thoughts about 'opening things' that we take to be expressed by these sentences are ones in which the 'things' at issue are construed as some sort of coherent subcategory of all the things that one could talk about opening, so, e.g., it might be the category of things that can contain stuff inside them, like boxes, envelopes, files, The language is full of such polysemous verbal-nominal words; consider, for instance, 'fall', 'rest', 'cut', 'run', 'jump', 'skip', 'walk', 'start', 'end', 'turn', 'slip', 'pass', 'talk', sign', 'file', and so on. 7 As Rayo points out, this kind of grammatical and semantic versatility has been tackled by computationally-minded linguists through the postulation of an array of (sometimes quite complex) lexical-semantic rules (see, e.g., Pustejovsky 1995, Asher 2011).
7 On the account of the ('exo-skeletal') lexicon developed by the syntactian Hagit Borer, words as isolated entities (or 'listemes', as she calls them) do not belong to specific syntactic categories but only acquire syntactic status when they are used in particular syntactic structures (see Borer 2005) . This view appears likely to mesh better with the ideas being pursued here than the predominant view among syntacticians which has much of the grammar projected from complex lexical entries (the 'endo-skeletal' view of the lexicon).
There is a major obstacle to any lexical rule approach which is that since the range of concepts that a word can be used to convey is indefinite, commensurate with the Which (of the first three) of these is the lexical concept WINDOW from which the others are pragmatically derived? None seems more intuitively basic than the others, nor the most useful as a starting point from which the others could be pragmatically derived in context.
Cases of part-whole or metonymically related senses, which are surely among the most ordinary, everyday and uncreative of our uses of language, seem to be highly problematic in this regard. The noun 'novel', for example, discussed at length by Bosch (2007) The fourth and final consideration concerns semantic compositionality. As Fodor has pointed out repeatedly, there are some fundamental properties of language and thought, namely their systematicity and productivity, that can only be explained by the semantic compositionality of these representational systems: there is a basic stock of primitives (words/concepts) with stable semantic values and a recursive syntax such that the semantic value (content) of any sentence/thought is a function of the semantic value of the primitives and the way in which they are syntactically combined. With regard to the 'compositionality' of thoughts/concepts, Fodor (1998: 25-27 ) says: "Since it's required to explain productivity and systematicity, compositionality is, as one says, 'not negotiable'.
An account of concept possession that is incompatible with the compositionality of thought is, ipso facto, out of the running." Thus, he has argued that an account of concept content in terms of stereotypes or prototypes or inferential roles or partial definitions fails because these entities do not meet the compositionality requirement.
between word type meanings and concepts does not violate the non-negotiable compositionality constraint.
I hope that collectively these considerations provide sufficient impetus to warrant looking into non-conceptual characterisations of word type meaning.
Alternatives to concepts as word 'meanings'
The four alternatives I'm going to mention briefly here are either instantiations of the position Recanati (2004) calls the 'wrong format' view, i.e. linguistic 'semantics' does not provide a truth-conditional component (a 'content'), but still there is some stable, context-free meaning associated with the word type, or instantiations of the most radical contextualist position, which he calls 'meaning eliminativism', i.e. there is nothing resembling a stable word type meaning, but rather a collection of resources for conceptmaking that the lexical form activates.
The first possibility to consider is that all these apparently descriptive words 'behave as if they encoded pro-concepts' because that is what they do in fact encode, that is, they fall in with the general class of indexicals (which are subject to a pragmatic process of saturation, of finding the appropriate semantic value in the context). This is not an attractive solution, for several reasons. Indexicals constitute a specific small set of words, whose context-sensitivity is entirely systematic, while practically the whole of the descriptive vocabulary is modulated and in a non-systematic way. Indexicals come, in effect, with a slot and an instruction on the kind of thing to plug into the slot and the pragmatic process of slot-plugging is obligatory. The cases of context-dependence we are considering here are quite different: the pragmatically-derived concepts for a particular word can differ from each other in arbitrarily many ways and, even supposing we could set out the full range of parameters of variance, it would not be obligatory ( A second option is that a word type meaning is a 'formal' linguistic entity of some sort. For instance, in a discussion of the lexical semantics for classes of verbs, Glanzberg (2011) argues for a monadic conceptual root in a structural frame, along the following lines:
It is important to note here that the structural frames for particular classes of verbs ('open'
and 'hit' belonging to distinct classes) are grammatically determined and the components of the frames, act, cause, become, etc., are linguistic/grammatical elements, which are not identical to the ordinary concepts ACT, CAUSE, BECOME, etc. Whether the conceptual roots, '<open>', '<hit>', etc., are semantic or syntactic elements is left open (Glanzberg 2011: 9 ). This is clearly, then, a case of 'wrong format', that is, of linguistic semantic representations being a different kind of entity from conceptual (thought) representations, and the issue it raises, as for any other manifestation of this difference, concerns how we make the move from the one to the other in communication.
A third option is that words encode something schematic: a template for concept construction, a set of constraints, a rule for use, a sense-general meaning (or 'archisememe' or 'super-concept'), as variously discussed by Ruhl (1989 ), Moravcsik (1994 ), and Atlas (1989 . Ruhl, for instance, says: "… lexical meaning must be highly abstract (though still specific to a particular language), and thus highly formal, … remote from all ambient contingencies " (1989: ix Under the 'wrong format' position, Recanati (2004) 9 Another account within this broad category, one that warrants detailed discussion, is that of Ruth Kempson, Eleni Gregoromichelaki and Christine Howes (2011), who characterise word type meanings as 'lexical actions' or procedures, which together with the instructions provided by the syntax of a language constitute a set of mechanisms enabling the construction of representations of content by the interpreter in the process of utterance comprehension.
A clearly eliminativist position is the recent 'grab-bag' model of Rayo:
With each expression of the basic lexicon, the subject associates a 'grab-bag' of mental items: memories, mental images, pieces of encyclopaedic information, pieces of anecdotal information, mental maps and so forth. With the expression 'blue', for example, a subject might associate two or three particular shades of blue, the information that the sky is blue, the information that my bicycle is blue, a memory of a blue sweater, and so forth. Different speakers might associate different grab-bags with the same lexical item. (Rayo 2011) This looks very much like the kind of information associated with a word that is given as an encyclopaedic entry or material in a mental file in accounts that assume words encode concepts, as in relevance theory or Fodor (2008) . It surely doesn't qualify as the linguistic meaning or semantics of a word type -it is totally non-linguistic and largely contingent.
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An appealing aspect of this approach is that it seems to provide an immediate and simple solution to the polysemy/metonymy problem. Referring to his example of the polysemous verb-noun 'stop', mentioned above, Rayo says: "One can place a few key items in one's grab-bag for 'stop' -for instance, representations that bring to mind interfering, preventing, obstructing, closing -and let common sense and sensitivity to context take care of the rest." And there is no need for different grab-bags for different grammatical categories: "a mental image that evokes obstruction, for example, can be used to render salient the action of closing a valve when interpreting … 'she stopped the flow of oxygen' and to render salient a knob on a pipe organ when interpreting … 'she moved the stops to control the air flow into her organ'" (Rayo 2011). It is not too difficult to envisage a grab-bag for the word 'novel', which would include information about the stories, plots and characters that authors imagine, the written (or virtual) texts they may produce as a result, the publication, printing, selling and distribution processes, and the resulting physical copies. On different occasions of use, different selections are made from the grab-bag, in accordance with 'common sense and sensitivity to context', which I take to be a (somewhat cavalier) reference to the cognitive interpretive processes that a pragmatic theory seeks to explain.
An approach along these wholly pragmatic lines would put an end to the need for an array of semantic rules, even supposing they are formulable, and the futile attempts to decide which of the various senses of polysemous words to take as the basic one. Of course, it remains to be spelled out in detail exactly how the grab-bag selection process works, particularly how it can result in a concept with a truth-conditional content, but the basic intuition seems to be very much in keeping with the ad hoc concept construction process in relevance theory, as outlined in Section 2.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was modest: to present a range of reasons for taking seriously the idea that words (or lexical forms) may not encode concepts or map directly to contentful entities, but rather come with meaning-relevant components that are different in kind from semantic values, that are intrinsically underspecified with regard to content, where a content is what is expressed/communicated by an individual's use of a word and so is only determinable on an occasion of use. Thus, this hypothesis is only worth exploring when coupled with a well-developed pragmatic theory that seems capable of providing a detailed account of how the concepts a speaker intends to express can be recovered by her addressee on the basis of such underspecified meanings or encyclopaedic information.
Abandoning a conceptual lexical semantics raises a host of new questions. First, there is the issue of maintaining a distinction between genuinely indexical words and these cases of word meaning modulation; on a non-conceptual construal of word type meaning, the pragmatic process of finding an appropriate semantic value is no longer optional, so cannot be distinguished on those grounds from the obligatory process of indexical saturation. Second, the approach has consequences for (relevance-theoretic) pragmatics, in that we can no longer think in terms of the narrowing or broadening of denotations (or of concept adjustment) as there is no linguistically-specified denotation to narrow or broaden (and no concept to adjust). All concepts occurring in communicated thoughts (explicatures) are pragmatically inferred and merely constrained by an encoded lexical schema/template or an array of activated encyclopaedic information (a grab-bag). In that sense, all concepts expressed or communicated are 'ad hoc'. Third, there is a robust intuition that many words have a 'literal meaning', that there is a particular concept (or concepts) which, among the others that the word may be used to express, is somehow
